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WORLD-POLITICS.

LONDON: ST. PETERSBURG.

LONDON, *August, 1906.*

IF this Government can help it, the second Peace Conference at The Hague will not end in failure. British naval and military policy for the moment is avowedly directed towards making that Conference a success, or at least towards throwing the responsibility for its breakdown, if breakdown there be, upon non-British shoulders. The temper of the present House of Commons is emphatically a Peace Conference temper. That is to say, it is more earnestly set than any Parliament of the last thirty or forty years on establishing, if possible, some international common ground for the reduction of armaments. Since the philosophical and somewhat dreamy Radicalism of the middle nineteenth century was swamped in the tides of Imperialism, there has been no Government so possessed by the large humanitarian spirit. In this it reflects, beyond question, the general trend, momentary or otherwise, of public opinion. We are witnessing a certain reaction against Imperialism, both as a policy and as a school of thought. The lesson of the South-African war has bitten deep. The continuous fall in consols and the stagnation in the money-market, which persist in spite of great activity in ordinary commerce, are doubtless referable to more than one cause. But, at the head of the various factors that have combined to produce them, every one places the effects of the struggle with the Boers. When people find consols all but down to 87, when their income tax still stands at a war level, when they consider how utterly their hopes of regeneration in South Africa have been belied—largely, no doubt, because those hopes were extravagant—and how complete a mockery has been made of the high, patriotic and really Imperial emotions with which they entered

on the conflict of 1899 by the importation of Chinese labor under semi-servile conditions, it is natural that they should turn with impatient disgust from a policy that has borne such bitter fruit. The rise of the Labor Party is a rough-and-ready measure of their alienation from the Imperialism of the last two decades. Putting national well-being above national security, and insisting that what England does at home is vastly more important than what she does in South Africa or anywhere else, the Labor men have fostered and intensified the spirit and the conditions to which they owe their success.

I do not say that even the Labor men can rightly be described as being for peace at any price. In the clash with Turkey a few months ago, there was a virtual unanimity of agreement, both in and out of the House, that, if the Sultan did not yield to diplomatic pressure, force would have to be employed against him. But it is fair to say that the Labor Party as a whole views with intense suspicion every indication of a forward policy, either in Colonial or foreign affairs, regards itself as the special guardian of the native races throughout the Empire, is meticulously critical of all moneys that are not voted for the purposes of social reform at home, and particularly of moneys that are spent on what it considers the unproductive form of armaments, and is apt to judge all such questions by standards that are more empirical than Imperial. The nation, as a whole, does not go so far as the Labor section. But three influences besides those I have mentioned are propelling it perhaps three-quarters of the way. One is a profound conviction, buttressed by innumerable facts, that in one great department of national defence, the Army, the country is not by any means "getting its money's worth." In the last ten years, military expenditure has increased by about \$45,000,-000 *per annum*, without any proportionate increase in military efficiency. The second influence which stimulates the reaction against Imperialism is the advocacy, by some of the first soldiers of the age, of compulsory military service. The country feels, for one thing, that it cannot keep on indefinitely maintaining a voluntary army on its present extravagant basis. It feels, for another, that, unless proof can be furnished that economy and efficiency are not incompatible, it may be driven into the conscription which it loathes. Both motives urge it towards a substantial reduction of the Army estimates. And there is a third contribu-

ting influence more potent still. If armaments continue to absorb more and more of the revenue of the State, there will be little or nothing left for a constructive policy of domestic reform, unless Protection is called upon to pour money into the national treasury. In the general problem of defence, therefore, is involved, not merely a desire to set the world an example by being the first to reduce armaments, not merely an effort to extract twenty shillings' worth of utility from every pound spent, but a determination to ward off both Conscription and Protection.

The Government shares in and sympathizes with all these aspirations, and they have found within the last few weeks emphatic expression. On July 12th, Mr. Haldane introduced his Army scheme. It reduces the regular army by 20,000 men and knocks off nearly \$10,000,000 a year from the estimates. At the same time, by rendering the militia liable to service abroad and by using it for transport, ammunition, medical and other services (where at present only regulars are employed), Mr. Haldane claims that an expeditionary force 154,000 strong, fully equipped, and capable of instant mobilization, will be evolved if his plans are adopted. For wastage during the first six months of a war, Mr. Haldane looks to the militia, one battalion of which is to stand behind every regular battalion of the home army. For further expansion he falls back upon the volunteers, who are henceforward to be organized on a county basis and placed under the control of local associations. I am not enough of an expert in military matters to criticise this scheme. It has been dubiously received; but that means nothing. Mr. Haldane has one advantage on his side which his predecessors at the War Office were denied—he has time. The Government will last until the Septennial Act puts an end to its existence; and unless some incalculable political upheaval occurs, it will return to power, though with a diminished majority. Mr. Haldane, therefore, may reasonably be sure of from six to twelve years in which to translate his plans into practice; and, from what I know of him and from what I understand of the principles on which he is working, I feel a strong personal confidence that, long before he leaves the War Office, it will be recognized that he has solved the Army problem. His scheme, at any rate, preserves the voluntary system, makes for economy and efficiency, introduces, so far as the volunteers are concerned, the invaluable stimulus of healthy local

competition, and fully accepts what is known in England as the "blue-water principle"—the principle that this country may safely rely on its navy for home defence, except in the limited case of raids by small parties, which can be met and repelled by volunteer forces. These are the outstanding features of the scheme; and except to those who believe that some form of compulsory service would be as much a physical and moral, as a military, gain for England, they are sufficient. If Mr. Haldane proves unable with all the circumstances in his favor to apply them successfully, then the voluntary system of enlistment will have received a staggering, if not a fatal, blow.

After the Army, the Navy. British naval policy has hitherto been regulated in accordance with the "two-Power standard." That is to say, the Admiralty and Parliament have made it their business to see that the British Navy was more than equal to the combined fleets of the next two strongest naval Powers. No matter who the next two strongest Powers might be, no matter whether a combination between them for the purpose of attacking Great Britain was or was not a political possibility, no matter what their relations with one another or with Great Britain might be, our policy has been to add their fleets together and then see to it that our own was greater than the result. That policy has now been thrown over by the present Government. The Prime Minister declared on July 27th, during the debates on the Navy Estimates, that, when applied without reference to political likelihood, the two-Power standard was "of an almost preposterous kind." That is a very important statement, because it introduces into the calculations of the Admiralty a new set of factors. They have now to consider the strength of the British Navy in relation, not to any possible, but to any probable, combination that may be brought against it. Ship-building, in other words, is to be governed from year to year by the Government's forecast of the course of international politics, and the two-Power standard, instead of being a fixed and unalterable rule, is for the future to serve only as a "rough guide." "When you talk of the two-Power standard," said the Prime Minister, "you cannot quite get out of your mind who the two Powers are. When we hear elaborate calculations made as to what France is building and what Germany is building, is it really a very likely combination that France and Germany should be allied and should go to war with us?" Those

words are the knell of the two-Power standard, in the accepted meaning of the phrase.

Acting on the new theory of allowing strategy to be dictated by politics, the Government have been able to effect a saving of over \$12,000,000 in this year's naval programme. When they came into office, they took over the estimates and programme prepared by their predecessors. They have reduced both. Instead of four "Dreadnaughts," they are going to lay down three; instead of five ocean-going destroyers, they propose building two; the coastal destroyers they leave at the number contemplated by the late Government, namely, twelve; but, in place of twelve submarines, they only intend laying down eight. In this way a saving of two and a half millions sterling is effected. Moreover, with a special view to its effect on The Hague Conference, the Government propose for 1907-8 a ship-building programme that is wholly conditional on the results of the Conference. "Instead of the four armored vessels," said the Secretary to the Admiralty, "which it was originally intended to lay down in 1907-8, we propose to make provision for two armored vessels only, but with the proviso, to be stated in the Estimates, that a third armored vessel is to be laid down if the proposals in regard to the reduction of armaments laid before The Hague Conference prove to be abortive. Further, the amount to be taken for new vessels to be laid down in 1907-8 is to be limited to a small sum, and they will not be commenced till a late period of the year, and this emphasizes to The Hague Conference the good faith of the British Government in its desire to bring about a reduction of armaments."

It is, of course, impossible to say how far this example will influence the deliberations at The Hague. But there can be no question that in setting it the British Government is acting with perfect sincerity and with a whole-hearted desire to see it followed. Their way of going about it may be, as Mr. Balfour said it was, somewhat unsophisticated. "How," he asked, "do you prove your good faith to The Hague Conference by saying, 'It is quite true we have diminished our Army expenditure, but our striking force is fifty per cent. stronger'? How do you produce this feeling of implicit belief in the pacific intentions of England, if you say, 'We have cut down the Navy Estimates, but we have got a fine fighting Board of naval lords, and they tell us we are fully

equal to any two of you, even after the reduction'?" For that, it has to be borne in mind, is the claim which the Government makes on the authority of the four Sea Lords who constitute the Board of Admiralty; and it is this claim that most interests the country. The Sea Lords who last October recommended the original programme are the same Sea Lords who now recommend its reduction. Were they extravagant last October, and are they merely rational now; or were they rational ten months ago and are they risking the supremacy of the sea by their parsimony today; or has anything happened since last October to justify them in revising their estimates? These are the questions that the country is very earnestly asking itself. I believe, as a matter of fact, that the ship-building programmes of certain foreign Powers have not advanced so quickly as last year seemed probable; but it can hardly be doubted that what has chiefly influenced the Sea Lords to cut down their original programme is the advent of a new Government avowedly bent on economy. The realization of this has somewhat shaken the confidence of the country both in the Government and in the Board of Admiralty; the more so as it is fully grasped that the "Dreadnaughts" belong to a class apart, discredit all existing types of battle-ship, will be the first line of the future, cannot be joined in a squadron with other types without sacrifice of their special efficiency, and are of such overwhelming superiority—four "Dreadnaughts" are reckoned to be fully equivalent to eight vessels of the "King Edward" class—that the Power which first secures a squadron of the new leviathans will have command of the sea. For that reason, the country would rather have seen the original programme adhered to, and economies effected in other directions. That course has not been followed, and it seems certain that by 1910 the country will have fallen considerably below the two-Power standard in the new type of ship, and may conceivably possess only two or three more than France. But the country, conscious of its enormous lead at sea, is not greatly disturbed by the prospect, though it could have wished it otherwise. Meanwhile, by reducing both the Army and the Navy, and saving in all some \$20,000,000 a year, the Government has contrived to carry out its pledges to the letter. It may mean a greater expenditure in the future—for I am bound to say that The Hague Conference is already discounted; but, for the moment, all is well; and the session closed

on August 4th with a record of legislative achievement unparalleled since the days of Gladstone's first Ministry.

ST. PETERSBURG, *August, 1906.*

My forecast of the fate of the Duma has unhappily come to pass; before the end of the month of July, the first Russian Parliament ceased to exist. As far back as the week when the Witté Cabinet received its notice to quit and was succeeded by the Administration of Goremykin, I ventured to predict that Duma and Government would quarrel irreconcilably, and that the people's representatives would be sent back to their homes without having left the Statute-book of the empire better than they had found it by a single measure. From that firm conviction I never swerved. In my last letter, while the deputies were still full of hope drawing up lists of Liberal Ministers and distributing the various portfolios among their friends, I wrote: "Whatever the attitude of the deputies, the final result will probably be the same. The Duma will be dissolved and new elections ordered, over which the Government will presumably do more than merely preside." And it could not be otherwise. The Duma and the Cabinet were two opposite poles, a pair of negations between whom reconciliation was impossible. The only question was how the break would come, whether the leading party in the legislature would deliberately seek or avoid it. As for the Government, it was firmly resolved to leave the odium of responsibility to the lawmakers turned lawbreakers.

At last the clash came, and came as a surprise to the very group that had provoked it. The Constitutionalists had done their utmost to bring it about; yet, when at last it had become inevitable and imminent they hugged the strange delusion that everything was moving smoothly and that their day of triumph was at hand. For hours, nay, for days, the palace chronicles affirm, Professor Muromtseff and several leaders of the Constitutionalists held themselves in readiness, with specially starched collars and cuffs, and the most correct thing in ties, awaiting His Majesty's gracious summons to Peterhof. The speeches, too, annalists aver, had also been carefully prepared, which would be addressed to the unwonted ears of the monarch who was henceforth to be weaned from power, and taught to reign but not to govern. He was to be transformed into a golden figurehead on

the ship of state. "The Duma deputies," Count Tolstoy was just then saying, "produce a comic impression upon me, because they resemble children who play at being adults." The prophet's cutting remarks were resented by politicians, but in this case, perhaps, he was not wholly wrong. Certainly, the picture of the pale faces of the deputies, rendered tragically solemn by the imaginary shadow of coming responsibility and by the courtly stiffness and dazzling whiteness of glazed starch, waiting confidently for what could not come, is not altogether devoid of a comic element. For, in lieu of the invitation to Peterhof, of the special train and court carriages to convey them thither, there came merely a brief notice to quit. A more bitter cut of the keen irony of Fate it would be difficult to imagine.

Towards the Russian nation Fate is even still more cruel. Take one of many instances. The Tsar, despite his grave defects, means well to his subjects, and has endeavored to show it in a very clumsy manner. Having recognized the terrible evil which the old system of misrule had wrought to the nation, he was making heavy personal sacrifices to remedy them. Thus, he voluntarily limited his absolute power; he solemnly promised to share it with the people; and he was really willing to work together with the nation's chosen spokesmen. But he dropped a little gall into the wine he set before them when he appointed Goremykin and Stishinsky to be the chief members of his Government. Thereby he undid what he had done. It was like constructing a piece of complicated machinery, and then destroying its mainsprings. On the other hand, the Duma was animated at the outset by intentions of the kind with which the floor of Tartarus is said to be paved. For here, too, there was a deadly solvent of all fruitful action,—the revolutionary spirit which, at first fitfully and then permanently, took possession of the men who had shortly before been moderate Liberals. It ought to have been manifest to everybody gifted even in a moderate degree with political sense that, between a Government which thus personifies reaction and a representative assembly which puts its faith in revolution, there could be no *modus vivendi*. This fact the clearer-headed members of the Government discerned from the outset and discounted accordingly; but the political instinct of the deputies was so far at fault that they believed firmly all would end well for them, and a Liberal administration be substituted for the Goremykin Cabinet.

Sancta simplicitas! It reminds one of the *naïveté* of Strauss, the Tübingen rationalist, who first shocked the entire Christian world by his Life of Jesus, and then applied for a cure of souls in Würtemberg, for which he considered himself perfectly fitted. And his disappointment was great when it was refused to him on the ground that he was not a Christian. Justice compels the impartial observer conversant with the ins and outs of Russian politics to state that, in all this, both sides are to blame. The Tsar, when dismissing Witté's Cabinet, probably intended to govern either in a more or in a less Liberal sense than theretofore. In the latter case, his only intelligible course was to appoint official advisers who would gradually nullify the liberties which he had just bestowed; and, in the former, he should have had recourse to real progressive Ministers. In fact, he did neither one thing nor the other. On the one hand, he declared his resolve to continue to uphold the innovations which he had recently introduced; but, on the other hand, he raised to the post of Prime Minister an unflinching advocate of the old *régime* and to the position of Minister of Agriculture the recognized enemy of land reform. One cannot hope to explain such acts on any theory other than that Fate has taken the *dramatis personæ* of the Russian Tragedy into her own hands, and is treating them as puppets.

The Constitutionalist Democrats, commonly nicknamed "Kadets," formed the leading group in the Duma. They were more numerous than any other, better acquainted with parliamentary government, well organized and possessed of larger funds, of which they are said to have expended one million and a half rubles (about \$750,000) in the elections. Naturally, they looked for some return. For, professing to have at heart the establishment of legality in the land, they felt confident that the Tsar would soon find it to his interest to appeal to them to stay the inroads of anarchy. He doubtless would have done this if the Kadets had been independent. But it was obvious from the first that they were borne in on the crest of a revolutionary wave, at the highest point of which—where they were—was mere foam, and that underneath the spray were the depths of darkness. They could not dispense with the support of the extreme and revolutionary parties whom they were constantly forced to conciliate. The Kadets, unhappily for themselves, deemed it consequently necessary or advantageous to employ two sets of weights and

measures, to speak in two idioms, to smile sweetly upon the revolutionists and to wink significantly at the moderates. And they were ultimately overtaken by the fate which threatens all who strive to serve two masters. During the election campaign, for instance, they circulated two different versions of their proclamation, one to the educated burgher who respects property, and the other to the peasant who will not respect it until he has wrested the land from its present owners. In the former declaration, they promised to pay for the land which they would take away and distribute among the peasants. In the latter, they undertook to sequester the soil and hand it over to the horny-handed tiller, free of all charges, and without any compensation to the present landowners. In a word, they blew hot and cold, and termed it "parliamentary tactics." That was an unwise proceeding on the part of men whose cause claims to be identical with that of truth, justice, and liberty. And as the party began so it ended. In discussing the appeal to the people which was the proximate cause of the dissolution, they voted that the word "fair valuation" of the land should be struck out. And it was. What that means is obvious. Now, a popular cause should be tarnished by no pettifoggery, no tergiversations. Its word should be "yea" or "nay." Like Cæsar's wife it should be above suspicion. If the Kadet party had been this, the Tsar, who knows that the past cannot be recalled, who desires to be reconciled to the present and safeguarded in the future, would have requested them to take over the reins of government. But, if he believed that he could never trust Count Witté, he felt absolutely sure that he could put no confidence whatever in the Kadets.

For, besides talking in two different languages to the electors, did they not recoil from offending the very anarchists lest these should withdraw their support? When the abolition of corporal punishment was being discussed several weeks ago, the Kadets were asked by an earnest advocate of law-born liberty to condemn all murders indiscriminately by whomsoever committed. But the champions of legality and order refused. The deaths decreed by the Government they would stigmatize as immoral and abominable, but not the revolutionary *Vehmgerichte* that secretly condemned an unsuspecting and innocent man to death without hearing him, and then blew his brains out, sometimes in presence of his wife and children. They would not execrate or blame Rus-

sians who fired upon passengers in railway cars or wrecked whole trains by way of establishing a reign of terror. Now, could the Tsar, however liberal-minded, fail to note that significant refusal? Can he be blamed for not delivering himself up to the mercies of that political party? These shifty tacticians, in whose ranks were many clever theorists and self-sacrificing patriots, maintained their character to the last. When from lawmakers they were about to become lawbreakers and to issue a proclamation over the heads of Ministers to the Russian nation, an amendment was proposed by M. Ephremoff to this effect: "The Imperial Duma warns the population against all rioting and condemns violence from whatsoever it emanates." It was a warning calculated to tranquillize the population. It was also certain to reassure the Tsar and the peaceful elements in the empire. But the Kadets were hostile to the salutary exhortation, and in the Duma only forty-six deputies voted for it. All the others, therefore, were not absolutely opposed to rioting and the employment of violence. That was the unavoidable conclusion, and the Government drew it.

Yet the Duma, which refused to utter the quieting *quos ego* to the revolutionary winds, fulminated anathemas against the anti-Jewish rioters of Belostok. Why? A matter of tactics, says the moderate press. In the former case the Kadets would have endangered their future; in the latter they were promoting their own interests and attacking those of the Government. Double weights and double measures. And it was really those tactics which undermined the authority of the Kadets as a force of order and peace in the land, and warranted their enemies, on the Left as well as on the Right, in setting them down as revolutionaries, as the orators of the party of violence, as the forerunners of insurrection. And for a party whose real strength lies in its love of law and order and its loyalty to the constitution, such a rôle as that is simply ruinous. The revolutionists, of whom they admittedly stood in awe, treated them as tools that could be put to almost any use. On the 29th of July, shortly before the dissolution of the Duma, a very radical journal wrote:

"We are on the eve of a decisive step. We have it in our power to push the Duma on to the revolutionary road. The ranks of the burghers are quaking. Their right wing is prepared to retreat, is making ready to play false to the public cause. It behooves us to do everything we can to cut off their retreat."

The threat was serious, the boast was true. Down to that day, the Duma had, in lieu of attempting to solve urgent problems, instead of reforming the electoral law, giving equal rights to the Jews, satisfying the reasonable demands of the Poles, turning religious toleration into religious freedom, fought the Government and it did little else. Still, in spite of weak impulses and fitful velleities, it had theretofore very wisely confined the struggle to the constitutional domain. But, at last, intoxicated by its own eloquence, the Parliament forgot its *rôle*, neglected its interests, and, worse still, pushed aside the interests of the Nation and set itself to draw up an appeal to the people. That act was illegal, it was an encroachment upon the prerogatives of the Tsar. Perhaps it was necessary? Perhaps; if so, that is its justification. But in that case a revolution was necessary. Now, what could have rendered a revolution indispensable in the course of a single uneventful day? The fatal measure taken by the deputies was doubtless explicable as the result of great excitement. But, none the less, it seemed to impartial outsiders morally wrong and tactically unwise. It was a sin against the constitution which the Kadets claimed the almost exclusive right to defend. It was lawbreaking instead of lawmaking.

Again it must be admitted that the Duma had had provocation and precedent from the Tsar's advisers, whose policy was to the full as eccentric as its own. For example, the right of appeal to the country belongs exclusively to the Crown. Yet the Cabinet issued its famous declaration, addressing the Russian people directly over the heads of the deputies.

But, however often the Cabinet might have violated its own laws, the Parliament at least ought to have given an example of submission to them. Therein lay the secret of its influence, as Samson's strength had its source in his hair. And, since the address to the nation and the more violent appeal which was drawn up in Finland, the Kadet party has lost its prestige.

That is but one of the unpleasant aspects of the matter. There are others which are still more deplorable. Thus, the only praiseworthy motive which the Duma could have had in addressing the nation unconstitutionally was to wield its influence over the masses beneficently. Therefore it possessed, at least in its own estimate, considerable influence over the people. But why was that suasive power never used to hinder crime, to end the reign of

terror? Nay, why was it put forth to arouse the population against the authorities, who, though indeed contemptible, are the legally constituted powers in the Empire? Why shower down sparks on a powder-magazine if your object be really to hinder an explosion? In truth, the Duma's appeal to the people was not intended to work as a sedative. It was just the contrary. And for that reason it was a suicidal act on the part of the legislature. The Government wielded brute force only, whereas the Duma in general and the Kadet party in particular professed to rely solely on moral influence. Yet in an evil hour deputies forfeited their moral power and challenged their adversary to mortal combat. Of course, the Government accepted the challenge, and will use the armed force at its disposal if . . . In that "if" we may find the line of cleavage between revolution and evolution. If the army is loyal, the monarchy is safe. If the troops in Finland and the marines in Cronstadt may be taken as a fair sample of the rest, the Empire is on the eve of disappearing.

It was in Finland that the deputies, after the dissolution of the Duma, called upon the people henceforth to pay no taxes and provide no recruits. Here they clearly showed how thin the partition was that divided them from the revolutionists. This second proclamation was at bottom a call to insurrection as the *mujik* understands it. And, in truth, there was no need to urge him onward. He was already busy pillaging by day, burning by night. Manors, old family seats, art treasures, country houses, and even granaries filled with corn were being burned down without ruth. The flames gave light to panic-stricken women, old men, children who were trying to escape with their lives. In Bobroff alone, fifteen such enormous bonfires turned night into day, leaving impressions the memory of which will not soon die. The peasants burned the very corn, for lack of which many of their own brothers are starving. Truly, if the deputies of the Duma had any influence over the peasantry, religion, patriotism, humanity, would have enjoined them to wield it unhesitatingly in order to put an end to this pandemonium of anarchy.

They were besought to do so by their own constituents. Letter after letter came imploring them to interfere. Deputy Gvozdieff, for example, of the Province of Tula, received a petition containing a vivid description of the agrarian riots there, and imploring him to induce the Duma to calm the people. They had uttered

strong words when the Jews of Belostok were attacked, and they would doubtless do as much for the Christians.

A telegram was sent from Zadonsk by the voters there beseeching the Duma to take measures to stop all agrarian rioting, and to do this at once, before even the land question should be solved. But to these and similar cries of despair there was no response. Or, rather, there came one at last in the shape of the exhortation to the rioters to trample on the law!

In this way Duma and Government, the two institutions to whom the Russian people looked for succor in their dire straits, took to fighting each other, and adjusting their public policy to the exigencies of party tactics! Riots and bloodshed are now the order of the day. From all this lawlessness the country is suffering unspeakably. In consequence of strikes, of fires, of the stagnation in industry, prices of necessities have risen. The manufacturing firms refuse to bear the losses inflicted by strikes, and so the peasant and the workman have to bear them. The firm of Zindel, for example, has netted during the financial year just ended $24\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on its capital of six millions, while Morozoff's Glukhoffskey Works have yielded $36\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. interest. These results were obtained despite the war, the armed insurrection and the series of strikes. How? Simply by raising the prices of cotton and other stuffs which the poorer classes are compelled to buy. Eighteen months ago a yard of printed calico cost about $5\frac{1}{2}$ cents; now it cannot be had for less than 7. Other stuffs have risen in like manner from 4 to $5\frac{1}{2}$ cents, from $5\frac{1}{4}$ to $7\frac{1}{8}$, and from 14 to $17\frac{3}{4}$. The raw cotton heretofore used in Russian manufactures amounted to \$260,000,000 a year; at present only \$200,000,000 worth are employed; statisticians have calculated that the tax thus paid by the peasantry of Russia to the strikes amounts to about \$37,500,000. And it is increasing, for prices are still going up.

Again, the Duma, having exhorted the people to lawlessness, seems to have lost sight of the fact that the masses contain conservatives as well as revolutionists. If killing be no murder when committed by these, it must be equally blameless or praiseworthy when accomplished by those. If in Poland a train was held up and two generals shot dead by revolutionists, solely because they were generals, it is to be feared that prominent Liberals will be shot dead by Russian "patriots," who take the opposite side.

Already a beginning has been made. Professor Herzenstein, the author of the agrarian bill favoring expropriation, has been shot dead in Terioky, a little Finnish watering-place near St. Petersburg. It is to be feared that this is only the first step. Once let public opinion applaud political murder, and the moral sense of the community becomes distorted. In Russia, we are in presence of civil war carried on by means of assassination, incendiarism, mutinies of troops. If the army, or any large body of it, goes over to the revolutionists the days of the Dynasty are counted. In Sveaborg the soldiers have mutinied, in Cronstadt the marines, in the Caucasus the troops are reported to be disaffected, in Peterhof itself a regiment of the Guards recently proved disloyal and was publicly disgraced.

Meanwhile, the Tsar appears to be conscious of the seriousness of the peril. He has dismissed the three reactionaries in the Cabinet, and is appointing moderate Liberals in their places. The present Premier, Stolypin, is himself a moderate Liberal and an honest man. He hopes to carry the next elections, as a chess-player may hope to cry "check" and "mate" in a fixed number of moves. But, before that, he himself may meanwhile be checkmated. While Stolypin is busy in the constitutional sphere, the struggle is quickly passing to the revolutionary. If there be still any hope of warding off a sanguinary uprising, it can be done only by giving the Jews equal rights, by satisfying the just demands of the Poles, the Little Russians, the Armenians, Georgians, Lithuanians and Letts, by bestowing additional grants of land on certain categories of peasants, and by giving entire religious liberty to all. Against some of these concessions, however, the Emperor has set his face. For example, he has pledged his Imperial word not to consent to expropriation, and he is known to dislike the Jews. Still, if Mr. Stolypin should be more successful in coaxing him to give way than Count Witté was, things may perhaps improve. But the chances are slender. Why, above all things, did the Tsar fix March for the opening of the new Duma, instead of simply giving that as the time limit before the expiring of which the new legislature would assemble? Is it, in truth, because he is the man of Fate? I feel convinced that the new Duma must assemble before next March, or else it will not come together until a red wave of revolution has swept over the land.